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PRESCRIPTIONDRUGS AND OPEN HOUSING: MORE
ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH
by
Howard 0. Hunter*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been an assumption of American democracy that the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution
are fundamental to the development and success of a democratic
society. The freedom to speak one's mind, to publish one's thoughts,
to petition the government for a redress of grievances, and to wor-
ship or to refrain from worshipping according to one's conscience are
those freedoms which set a democratic society apart from other
forms of political organization. They provide the individual with the
opportunity for self-fulfillment and the society with the benefit of
the thoughts, ideas, and aspirations of an enormous variety of
human minds. If common sense prevails, the social and political
organization will reflect the consensus of its members as to the best
of those ideas.' The Constitution contains a number of provisions
designed to protect individual liberties and to render the state sub-
ject to the will of the people. In a legal sense each provision of the
Constitution stands equally with each other provision.' Conflicts
can and do arise, however, between competing constitutional inter-
ests. To the extent that any judicial pattern can be discerned, there
has been a developing tendency to treat First Amendment liberties
* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971,
Yale University.
I In the absence of such a consensus, the democratic polity may find itself in a much
weaker position than rivals whose social organization is less democratic. Both the Vietnam
and Korean Wars are good examples. In neither instance was there a general debate or a
general public understanding of the causes of the war, the American interest in the area, the
magnitude of the commitment, or the likely outcome, prior to the entry of the United States
on a large scale. Whether or not the United States would have entered either war if there had
been a prior public discussion is debatable, but the absence of an initial national consensus
led inevitably to difficulties in waging the wars. Prohibition, by way of contrast, was a hotly
debated topic for decades prior to the passage of America's silliest constitutional amendment.
What that debate lacked was an application of common sense.
2 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, para. 2, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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as first among equals. That is to say, when there is a conflict be-
tween a First Amendment freedom and another constitutionally
protected right, there is a slight tilt toward the former.3
The government has, from time to time, attempted to squelch
speakers or newspapers,4 but the courts have generally refused to
allow significant governmental intrusion into areas of free expres-
sion. As Justice Cardozo stated in a 1937 opinion:
[F]reedom of thought, and speech . . . is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.
With rare aberrations a pervasive recognition of that truth can
be traced in our history, political and legal.'
Professor Louis Pollak has carried Cardozo's point a bit further:
The political processes of a democratic community of
course depend on free thought and free expression. But the
freedoms cut deeper still. Science, religion, art, poetry-all the
aspects of man's reaching out for wider horizons-depend upon
free inquiry and free intellectual exchange.'
This proposition is illustrated by the recent case of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96
S. Ct. 2791 (1976), in which the Supreme Court overruled a "gag order" imposed on reporters
by a state court judge in a criminal trial. The "gag order" was ostensibly designed to protect
and to preserve the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused, but according to the Court it
was too pervasive in scope and infringed upon the First Amendment rights of the press. The
Court refused to say that one amendment carries more weight than another. It reiterated a
judicially created presumption against the validity of any prior restraint on speech or the
press and suggested that alternatives to the suppression of speech were available for the
protection of an accused from prejudicial publicity. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, stated:
Settled case law concerning the impropriety and constitutional invalidity of prior
restraints on the press compels the conclusion that there can be no prohibition on
the publication by the press of any information pertaining to pending judicial
proceedings or the operation of the criminal justice system, no matter how shabby
the means by which the information is obtained. This does not imply, however, any
subordination of Sixth Amendment rights, for an accused's right to a fair trial may
be adequately assured through methods that do not infringe First Amendment
values.
Id. at 2816 (Brennan, J., concurring). Of course, press conduct and publicity concerning
judicial proceedings may lead to reversals or modifications on appeal and new trials. See, e.g.,
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
The restraints imposed upon the press by the federal government during the Civil War
are among the most notorious. See Hall, Free Speech in War Time, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 526
(1921). There were also the short-lived Alien and Sedition Acts and miscellaneous other
attempts at governmental sanctions such as those involved in the Pentagon Papers case, New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
II L. POLLAK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 4
(1966).
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As the comments of Justice Cardozo and Professor Pollak indi-
cate, there is a tendency to discuss First Amendment freedoms in
connection with their value to the political and legal processes, to
artistic and religious expression, and to intellectual inquiry. An area
in which free expression is no less valuable is the commercial mar-
ketplace, although speech in a commercial context has not been
considered as sacrosanct. The American constitutional system is
founded on the development of eighteenth century notions of pri-
vate property no less than on the political notions of free expression
and popular rule. John Locke, the philosophical source of much of
what we call Jeffersonian, helped to provide the basis for the devel-
opment of a political system which recognized an individual's right
to own property in his own stead, separate and apart from the state
and other individuals.7 We tend to forget what a revolutionary con-
cept that was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The recognition and protection of private rights in property was
certainly important to the Virginia landholders who were instru-
mental in the formation of the republic, but private property be-
came even more important during the course of the industrial revo-
lution.' Although some economists and businessmen may argue that
the state now affords less protection to private property rights than
See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V (Barnes & Noble ed.
1966).
1 At times in American history, it has seemed as if the protection of private property was
the right which was first among equals in the Constitution. After all, Thomas Jefferson and
his fellow Virginians were slaveholders and their northern comrades were tolerant of slavery
in the new republic. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Supreme
Court gave its blessings to freedom of contract and individual enterprise and struck down a
New York law which would have limited the number of hours of employment per week of
bakers. The remarks of President Hadley of Yale University at the University of Berlin in
1908 are also of considerable interest in this regard:
The fundamental division of powers in the Constitution of the United States is
between voters on the one hand and property owners on the other ...
This theory of American politics has not often been stated. But it has been
universally acted upon . . . . To mention but one thing among many, it has al-
lowed the experiment of universal suffrage to be tried under conditions essentially
different from those which led to its ruin in Athens or in Rome. The voter was
omnipotent-within a limited area. He could make what laws he pleased, as long
as those laws did not trench upon property right. He could elect what officers he
pleased, as long as those officers did not try to do certain duties confided by the
Constitution to the property holders. Democracy was complete as far as it went,
but constitutionally it was bound to stop short of social democracy.
Hadley, The Constitutional Position of Property in America, 64 INDEPENDENT 837 (1908),
quoted in F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1970).
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it once did,' it cannot be denied that such rights continue to be the
basic underpinning of the American free enterprise system. The
purpose of this inquiry is not, however, to consider the merits of
state intrusion into the free enterprise system; rather, the focus here
is on state regulation of free expression in the marketplace. The
courts are beginning to give credence to the proposition that speech
does not lose its First Amendment protection simply because it is
uttered in connection with a business proposal. Yet, the courts have
continued to apply a different standard to the regulation of speech
in the commercial area from that applied to speech in political,
social, religious, or intellectual areas. This dichotomy raises signifi-
cant First Amendment questions particularly with respect to the
application of commercial speech standards to the advertising pages
of newspapers.
Despite the absolute prohibition in the First Amendment that
"Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press . . ," the courts have never adopted an absolutist
view of the amendment.'" Some regulation of speech has been con-
sidered desirable and necessary. For instance, speech is not pro-
tected when it is "obscene,"" when it is "libelous,' 2 when it creates
a "clear and present danger to the national security,"'" or when it
is part and parcel of the commission of an illegal act.'4 For no clear
I Compare, for instance, the judicial reasoning in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918), where the Supreme Court invalidated a child labor law, with that in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), where the Court sustained an application of a federal agricul-
tural act which had the effect of limiting the production of wheat on a single farm. The latter
approved a vastly greater degree of federal governmental intrusion into private business
affairs than would ever have been countenanced by the Court of 1918.
,0 See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47-
62 (Vintage ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
" See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
,2 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" The first exposition of the "clear and present danger" test was in the opinion of Justice
Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
" The law of conspiracy offers the clearest example of an instance in which the act of
speaking itself becomes a part of the prohibited activity. Some method of communication is
necessary to effect a conspiracy, and that communication may subject the speaker to liability
even though it is nothing more than speech. See generally Note, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872 (1970).
An interesting discussion of the extent to which the First Amendment may offer protec-
tion from the antitrust laws where there is a joint effort among competitors to influence
legislation or participate in the judicial, administrative, or legislative process may be found
[Vol. 25
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
reason the Supreme Court also created an ambiguous exception for
"commercial speech" in the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen. 15
"Commercial speech" was there defined as speech which does noth-
ing more than propose a commercial transaction. Neither
Chrestensen nor any of the cases following it held that commercial
speech was absolutely unworthy of any First Amendment protec-
tion. The Court simply applied a different standard and allowed
regulation that would not have been considered appropriate in more
traditionally protected areas. 6 Two recent Supreme Court decisions
have significantly eroded the Chrestensen doctrine, and these will
be considered as they affect not only the commercial/noncom-
mercial dichotomy but also the regulation of newspaper advertising
in certain specific instances.
11. THE Chrestensen DOCTRINE
Mr. Chrestensen was one of a long line of American entrepreneurs
and hucksters. He owned a retired Navy submarine which he trans-
ported to various ports and opened to the public for a fee. One such
port was New York, where, after some difficulty, Chrestensen ob-
tained a moorage at an East River wharf. He then passed out hand-
bills to attract visitors to his submarine, but in so doing, he ran afoul
of an ordinance which prohibited the distribution of such handbills
on the city streets. Chrestensen reprinted his handbills and the new
ones contained a criticism of certain local officials on one side and
information about his submarine on the other. When the city fathers
still objected and threatened Chrestensen with legal action, he
in the series of cases which develop the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine. See California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961). See also Sadd, Huth, Cortesio, & Hunter, Report on Antitrust Implications
of Joint Industry Activities Under Price Controls, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 423 (1975).
' 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
" Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, stated without citation, "We are equally clear
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising." Id. at 54.
Two decisions prior to Valentine v. Chrestensen had approved the regulation of commer-
cial advertising, Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911), and Packer
Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). The Fifth Avenue Coach case was decided prior to the
time that the application of the First Amendment was extended to the states by Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); in the Packer case, the First Amendment issue was not
raised. See generally Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
1976]
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sought and was granted an injunction against the enforcement of
the ordinance. The city appealed, and the case finally reached the
Supreme Court. By that time World War II was under way and
submarines had other uses, which may explain the lack of sympathy
for Chrestensen. He lost unanimously without even the courtesy of
a citation to precedent. The Court considered the police power of
New York to be sufficiently broad to sustain the handbill prohibi-
tion. Moreover, it was singularly unimpressed with Chrestensen's
argument that the second handbill was protected as a legitimate
commentary on a political and legal issue because it contained a
criticism of certain public officials."
Although Chrestensen was harshly criticized,'8 the notion that
commercial speech was subject to state regulation was not novel.
Congress and state legislatures had enacted deceptive practices acts
and other statutes which had the effect of regulating advertising
prior to the Chrestensen decision. Chrestensen could only have en-
couraged more such legislation."9 As one court baldly put it,
, 316 U.S. at 54.
Justice Douglas, who was a member of the Court when Chrestensen was decided, said
twenty-nine years later that the "holding was ill-conceived and has not weathered subsequent
scrutiny." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See also Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36 B.U.L. REV. 239, 240 (1956):
This bald assertion that Chrestensen's handbills did not "communicate infor-
mation"; and that the Constitution sets a higher value on the liberty to save souls,
air one's grievances, or rouse political passions than it does on the liberty to earn a
living by ministering to the universal demand for instruction, relaxation, and enter-
tainment challenges an inquiry into the nature of constitutional liberty and the
nature of people's rights in their parks and streets. The present author entertains
no illusion that he is able to exhaust either the theory or the history of these
subjects; but perhaps a few minutes devoted to tracing a single thread through the
web of the last half century of legal history may serve to give courage to those who
still hold the doctrine that the ambition to serve one's contemporaries by rendering
a service which they are willing to pay for is at least as laudable as the ambition to
inspire, to save, or to rule the world.
" See Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1956);
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Deceptive Advertising]; Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78
HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1965); Developments in the Law-The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act, 67 HARv. L. REV. 632 (1954); Note, The Consumer and Federal Regulation ofAdvertising,
53 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1940), for discussion of various aspects of trade and advertising regula-
tion. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v.
FTC, 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957); American Medicinal Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1943); Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, 364 F. Supp. 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974), as examples
of government regulation in this area.
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"[r]egulation of commercial advertising does not intrude upon
First Amendment rights of free speech."2
The Chrestensen doctrine is founded on the idea that speech
which merely proposes a commercial transaction is subject to regu-
lation in a manner different from the regulation of speech in other
areas. Much of the case law in the commercial speech area has
centered on advertising, and it is easy to understand the initial
reluctance of judges to apply the hallowed principles of Jefferson,
Madison, and Holmes to the latest come-on for deodorants. Never-
theless, it cannot be denied that a proposal for a commercial trans-
action is a legitimate and necessary part of any economic system
whether it is privately or publicly controlled. The speaker's motive
to make a profit in no way lessens his need to communicate the
availability of his wares in order to sell them and to remain a func-
tioning part of the economy. Millions of spoken and printed words
each day merely propose commercial transactions and thus consti-
tute "commercial speech" as defined by Chrestensen. Communica-
tions between companies, sales calls by salesmen, radio, television,
and newspaper ads, flyers, pamphlets, billboards, posters-all pro-
pose the sale and purchase of a product or service. The response of
the recipient determines, in part, the economic success or failure of
the speaker. Thus, it is a fundamental requisite of a free economy
that there be a free flow of commercial messages in order to insure
the educated and reasonable exercise of economic decision making.2'
To the extent that governmental intrusion restricts that flow, the
rationality of private economic decisions may be adversely affected.
Such limitations may raise significant First Amendment questions.
While many ads may be designed to create a mood or to convey an
impression rather than to impart specific information,22 advertising
2" Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969). This was a suit
to enjoin enforcement of VA. CODE § 54-426.1 (1968) (repealed 1970), which was similar to
the statute challenged in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 36-43 infra.
21 Even in a centrally planned economy, the planners must have access to regular infor-
mation from various sectors of the economy in order to make rational planning decisions.
Indeed, the inability to obtain and to assimilate all the relevant bits of information in a
centralized plan has become one of the more serious shortcomings of the planned economies
of eastern European nations. See generally A. NovE, ThE SovIET ECONOMY (rev. ed. 1965).
22 For an interesting discussion of the commercial speech doctrine in the context of mood
or image advertising, see Note, The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 189 (1974).
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is still the basic means by which the public is informed about what
is available, where it is available, and how much it costs.
Attempts to justify or explain the commercial/noncommercial
speech dichotomy have been taken to considerable lengths. For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that commercial speech is not even
speech-that it is an outgrowth of property rights and not a part of
a system of free expression.23 Such a suggestion is nonsensical.
Speech does not lose its character as speech merely because its
content is commercial. A printed advertisement is not physically
different from a printed editorial. The aspirin peddler on television
talks and communicates in the same manner as a politician on the
campaign trail. The content of the speech does not alter the basic
nature of the method of communication. The focus in all the com-
mercial speech cases is on the spoken or printed word itself. Justice
Brennan's dissent in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,24 a case
which upheld a local ordinance allowing commercial ads on city
buses but disallowing political ads, is precisely on point:
And while it is possible that commercial advertising may be
accorded less First Amendment protection than speech con-
cerning political and social issues of public importance, . . .
it is "speech" nonetheless, often communicating information
and ideas found by many persons to be controversial. There
can be no question that commercial advertisements, when
skillfully employed, are powerful vehicles for the exaltation of
commercial values.2
An analysis of the commercial speech doctrine must focus on the
degree to which such speech can be regulated consistently with the
First Amendment. The reconsideration of the commercial speech
doctrine in two recent Supreme Court cases provides the proper
context for this analysis. 8
See, e.g., Deceptive Advertising, supra note 19, at 1027. It has also been suggested that
there is no clear understanding that those who drafted the First Amendment had in mind
commercial advertising. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 1191 (1965). It may be true that the draftsmen were primarily concerned with political
speech, but the failure specifically to approve commercial speech should not condemn it to a
lesser status. The constitutional draftsmen certainly never thought that the commerce clause
would be invoked to support the public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
24 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
23 Id. at 314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
26 Both of the cases arose in Virginia. Many of the strongest advocates of free speech and
[Vol. 25
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III. ABORTIONS AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY TEST
The first of the two recent Supreme Court cases, Bigelow v.
Virginia,17 involved a Virginia statute which prohibited the circula-
tion of any publication to encourage or to promote the procurement
of an abortion.28 Bigelow, the managing editor of a weekly Virginia
newspaper, published an advertisement which announced that
abortions were legal in New York and offered the services of a refer-
ral agency to assist in arrangements with a New York clinic. At the
time abortions were illegal in Virginia. The defendant was prose-
cuted and convicted of a misdemeanor. His appeal from the Su-
preme Court of Virginia reached the United States Supreme Court
during the pendency of the major abortion cases,29 and after the
Court decided those cases, it remanded Bigelow to the Virginia
Supreme Court for further consideration."' The state court reaf-
firmed the conviction in a terse per curiam opinion," and the Su-
preme Court reversed.
The Bigelow majority did not, however, eliminate the
commercial/noncommercial dichotomy. Instead, the Court resorted
to a detailed content analysis of the advertisement to determine
whether it was entitled to First Amendment protection notwith-
standing its commercial nature. The advertisement was clearly
commercial in that both the referral agency and the New York clinic
expected to make money on the venture. The determination that
press among the framers of the Constitution were Virginians, and that commonwealth is a
fitting locus for any First Amendment colloquy.
- 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
2' VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1950) (repealed 1975). For a good background discussion of the
case, see Note, Freedom of the Press, The Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Abortion
Advertisement, 24 EMoRY L.J. 1165 (1975).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
30 413 U.S. 909 (1973). The original appeal was taken from the Virginia Supreme Court's
initial affirmance of the conviction, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).
11 The Virginia Supreme Court's brief and pointed opinion read in pertinent part as
follows:
Bigelow's is a First Amendment case. He was convicted not of abortion but for
running in his newspaper a commercial advertisement for a commercial abortion
agency. We held that government regulation of commercial advertising in the
medical-health field was not prohibited by the First Amendment. We find nothing
in the new decisions of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton which in any way affects
our earlier view. So we again affirm Bigelow's conviction.
214 Va. 341, 342, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
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EMORY LAW JOURNAL
the advertisement was protected was based upon the conclusion
that it imparted specific information about a matter of public con-
cern and that it constituted fair comment on a matter of significant
public interest.2 There is no question that the advertisement pro-
vided the reader with certain factual information just as a news
column might have done; one reading the ad could have gone to
New York to investigate clinics and the availability of abortions
without the necessity of going through the referral agency. Nor is
there any question that abortion was, and continues to be, an issue
that has stirred a profound national debate.33
The difficulty with the Bigelow decision is that the reasoning
necessarily involves the courts in a content analysis of commercial
speech whenever it is subjected to governmental sanction. 4 If the
speech in question is determined to be commercial within the mean-
ing of Chrestensen, then, under Bigelow, the content must be ana-
lyzed to determine whether it conveys any significant information
or contains any significant social comment in order to decide its
entitlement to traditional First Amendment protection. This ap-
proach is analogous to the Court's attempts to deal with the
obscenity question by trying to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the "speech" in question has any socially redeeming im-
portance.S
"2 The courts have consistently agreed that social, political, artistic, or intellectual com-
ment will be protected even if it appears in an advertisement or some similar commercial
context. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the statements
complained of appeared in an advertisement.
" There is a significant problem, however, in this approach. Almost any statement can
be construed to be a comment on a matter of public interest or concern if someone is willing
to pay to have it printed and published. The courts could find themselves embroiled in a
series of questions about what is or is not of "significant" public concern. Consider, for
instance, the difficulties which the Supreme Court had with the determination of what is a
matter of "general public concern" in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
a defamation case. The shift from an analysis of public interest in the subject matter of a
publication to a consideration of the status of the libel plaintiff underscores this problem.
See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974); Note, An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation
Plaintiffs Applied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1131 (1976).
34 Justices White and Rehnquist, in dissent, were sharply critical of the content analysis
approach. They thought that the Chrestensen doctrine should be upheld and that the Court
was trying to create a nonexistent distinction between the commercial proposition in Bigelow
and other commercial propositions. 421 U.S. at 829-32.
1 Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966), with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). As Justice Brennan said in his dissent to the Paris Adult
Theatre opinion:
[Vol. 25
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Despite the victory of the publisher in Bigelow, the decision is
entirely consistent with the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy
created by Chrestensen. The Court certainly did not undertake any
detailed content analysis in Chrestensen, but the necessity of such
an analysis is implicit in the holding. Chrestensen allows the regula-
tion by the state of speech which does nothing more than propose a
commercial transaction. If it does "something" more, such speech
may be entitled to traditional First Amendment protection. Bigelow
partially defined the "something" more that may suffice to protect
the speech, but it did not affect the fundamental holding of
Chrestensen that commercial speech, as there defined, is not enti-
tled to the same degree of First Amendment protection as other
forms of speech.
More recently, the Court faced the commercial speech doctrine
directly in the Prescription Drugs case, Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.3" As part of
its regulatory scheme for the pharmaceutical industry, Virginia pro-
hibited pharmacists from advertising prescription drugs. 7 Virginia
argued that the purpose of its ban was to protect the unwary from
unscrupulous merchandising of potent drugs and to prevent a dete-
rioration in pharmaceutical quality that might result from price
wars and a concomitant decline in profits." A group of Virginia
consumers attacked the prohibition on the grounds that it denied
them the right to know what prices were being charged by what
drugstores for various prescription drugs, and evidence was intro-
duced which showed a tremendous disparity in price for the same
drugs. 9 The Court reasoned that the state was entirely capable of
maintaining a system of quality control through its educational and
licensing requirements for pharmacists. With only Justice
Rehnquist dissenting," the Court invalidated the Virginia statute.
No other aspect of the First Amendment has, in recent years, demanded so substan-
tial a commitment of our time, generated such disharmony of views, and remained
so resistant to the formulation of stable and manageable standards.
413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2 VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974). The statute provided that any pharmacist who advertised
prices would be guilty of unprofessional conduct.
425 U.S. at 766-68.
' Id. at 753-54.
,' Id. at 781. Rehnquist argued that Virginia had broad powers to regulate the flow of
information in the commercial area. His approach to Virginia's authority in this area reflects
a surprisingly paternalistic view of government. Perhaps his view can be more readily under-
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Interestingly, the Court based its decision in large part on the
right of the listener to receive the information rather than on the
right of the speaker to disseminate it. 41 This approach avoided a
thorny standing problem in that the statute was directed toward
pharmacists and not toward the public generally. 4 In addition, this
tack recognized the value of speech in a commercial context: it
conveys information on which a rational economic decision may be
made. With a ban on advertising in effect, Virginia consumers found
it difficult to compare prices on drugs. If the licensing and regula-
tory system worked properly, the quality of the drugs being offered
for sale by various pharmacists should have been equal. Where qual-
ity is equal and the product homogeneous, price is one of the most
crucial factors affecting consumer purchases. The advertising ban
led to a constant and undesirable series of irrational economic deci-
sions. Those who unwittingly bought from the highest priced phar-
macists not only did themselves a disservice; if they were eligible
for private or public health insurance plans, the public as a whole
was affected to the extent that higher drug prices increased the costs
of those plans.
For the first time, the Court clearly stated that speech does not
stood in terms of states' rights; that is, he is unwilling to read the Constitution to prohibit
Virginia from doing that which is not expressly reserved to the national government. Then
again, he may simply be hearkening back to the early Federalists. It was, after all, John
Adams and his colleagues who blessed the young republic with the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Justice Rehnquist also had considerable difficulty with the problem of standing:
The statute. . . only forbids pharmacists from publishing this price information.
There is no prohibition against a consumer group, such as appellees, collecting
and publishing comparative price information as to various pharmacies in an area.
Indeed they have done as much in their briefs in this case. Yet, though appellees
could both receive and publish the information in question the Court finds that they
have standing to protest that pharmacists are not allowed to advertise. Thus, con-
trary to the assertion of the Court, appellees are not asserting their "right to receive
information" at all but rather the right of some third party to publish. . . . Here,
the only group truly restricted by this statute, the pharmacists, have not even
troubled to join in this litigation and may well feel that the expense and competi-
tion of advertising is not in their interest.
Id. at 1836.
" This approach was somewhat unusual, but it was not novel. See generally EMERSON,
supra note 10, at 7-11; Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L.
Rev. 1191 (1965). See also the opinion of Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965):
The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to
print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read .. and
freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach. ...
42 See note 40 supra.
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lose its First Amendment protection because it is uttered in a com-
mercial context. Nevertheless, the Court was reluctant to disown
Chrestensen entirely, and it retained a test for determining the va-
lidity of regulation of speech in the commercial area:
Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that com-
mercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete sup-
pression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different
degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of
truthful and legitimate commercial information is unim-
paired."3
Thus the courts need not resort to an inquiry into the social signifi-
cance of the speech as was done in the Bigelow case, but the speech
must still be subjected to the test of truthfulness and legitimacy. To
determine whether the Prescription Drugs test applies, the courts
must initially determine whether or not the speech is "commercial."
Chrestensen may be weakened, but it still has some vitality.
The proposition that untruths are not privileged within the mean-
ing of the First Amendment is not peculiar to commercial speech.
The law of libel and slander bears witness to the disfavor in which
untruthful speech is held. In the areas of political, social, artistic,
religious, and intellectual comment, however, there has been a
growing tendency to be fairly lax about imposing strict standards
of truthfulness. It is recognized that the development of a demo-
cratic society requires a free-wheeling discussion, much of which
may eventually be proven false." A "calculated falsehood" is not
41 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis supplied). The Court also was careful to limit the
impact of its decision by stating that "quite different factors" may apply to advertising by
lawyers or doctors. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25 and 773-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Pharmacists
and professionals other than lawyers and doctors might look askance at distinctions between
the impact of the First Amendment on differing groups of professionals. The Court will,
however, shortly have an opportunity to express its opinion on the question of whether the
First Amendment prohibits advertising restrictions on lawyers. The Court has noted probable
jurisdiction of an appeal from a disciplinary proceeding in which two Arizona lawyers were
censured by the Arizona Supreme Court for advertising their services in a newspaper. Bates
v. Arizona State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 53 (1976). It would be possible for the Court to avoid the First
Amendment question entirely if it were to focus on the antitrust questions posed by the case
and to extend the impact of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). For a general
discussion of the Arizona case, see 62 A.B.A.J. 1422 (1976). A federal district court has relied
on Prescription Drugs to invalidate another Virginia law which prohibited advertising by
physicians. Health Sys. Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 45 U.S.L.W. 1078 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 4, 1976). If pharmacists are free to advertise, why not physidians, and if physicians,
why not lawyers?
" See note 47 infra. One need only recall the problems faced by Socrates, Columbus,
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protected by the First Amendment," and even a truthful publica-
tion of "private facts" may be unprotected if the subject matter is
not newsworthy." However, the courts have generally immunized
publications of opinion and social commentary."
Galileo, and Darwin to realize that societal acceptance of new ideas or theories is not always
readily forthcoming. For an intriguing discussion of the Socratic dilemma, see D'Amato,
Obligation to Obey the Law: A Study of the Death of Socrates, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1079 (1976).
11 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Also, as the Court pointed out in
Prescription Drugs, "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been pro-
tected for its own sake." 425 U.S. at 771.
11 The publication without consent of truthful statements concerning "private facts"
may be a tortious invasion of privacy if the subject matter is not "newsworthy." RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject
to liability to the other for unreasonable invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind which (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
The foregoing section was extensively discussed in Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th
Cir. 1975). That case concerned an article on body surfing which appeared in Sports
Illustrated. The complainant, a well-known body surfer in California, had voluntarily given
a lengthy interview to a Sports Illustrated reporter with full knowledge that there might be
an article published. Before the article appeared the complainant revoked his consent because
there were certain personal matters that he did not want publicized. The article was printed
despite his objection. In response to the defendant's truth defense, the court stated: "To hold
that [the First Amendment] privilege extends to all true statements would seem to deny
the existence of "private" facts. . . The public's right to know is. . . subject to reasonable
limitations so far as concerns the private facts of its individual members. . . The press.. .
cannot be said to have any right to give information greater than the extent to which the
public is entitled to have that information. . . . [U]nless it be privileged as newsworthy
• . . . ,the publicizing of private facts is not protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 1128
(footnotes omitted). On remand the district court determined that Time was entitled to
summary judgment based on the newsworthiness standard established by the court of ap-
peals. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 2329 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976). See also Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971); Kapellas v.
Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
11 The Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964),
one of the landmark cases in this area, stated:
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ...
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consis-
tently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth-whether administered
by judges, juries, or administrative officials-and especially one that puts the bur-
den of proving truth on the speaker . . . . The constitutional protection does not
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Commercial speech, therefore, is in no different posture from any
other form of speech when it is said that there may be some regula-
tion based on the truth or falsity of the speech. The difference lies,
however, in the method and manner of regulation. Prior restraints
on speech are frowned upon and rarely, if ever, upheld in the areas
of traditional First Amendment practice. As Justice Brennan said
in the Pentagon Papers case,
[The First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial
restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture
that untoward consequences may result. 8
And as Chief Justice Hughes stated in Near v. Minnesota,4 the
"chief purpose" of the First Amendment is to prevent prior re-
straints on publication or speech. Libel and slander laws provide
after-the-fact redress for injuries caused by unprotected speech.
On the other hand, most of the attempts to regulate truth in
commercial speech amount to prior restraints and even outright
censorship. A securities registration or the proxy statement of a
public corporation must receive the prior approval of the SEC be-
fore it can be made public.-" The Federal Trade Commission has the
power to enjoin the publication of advertisements which it deter-
mines to be deceptive and to exercise a continuing power of censor-
ship over the content of advertisements within the area of its juris-
diction.5 ' If an untruthful advertisement is published and a person
suffers injury as a result of reliance thereon, the advertiser may also
be subject to an after-the-fact remedy. 52 Thus, the commercial
turn upon "the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas or beliefs which are
offered."
The modem cases which allow considerable leeway in the expression of matters of opinion
generally derive from the classic dissent of Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919), where he affirmed his faith in free thought and expression:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.
" New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-26 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
49 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78n (1970).
, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-53 (1970).
52 In addition to whatever statutory remedies may be available for false advertising, an
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speaker may be subjected to controls over the content of his speech
both before and after publication. The existence of a post-injury
remedy may act as a restraining factor, but there is a significant
difference between the restraint occasioned by such a remedy and
actual pre-publication regulation by the state of the content of the
speech.
The prior restraints inherent in the regulation of advertising have
generally been justified on three grounds:
(1) The damage to a person's physical or pecuniary well-being
that is likely to result from reliance on a misleading advertisement
may be substantial.
(2) The truth or falsity of an advertisement may often be objec-
tively proven, which is rarely true of social or political comment.
(3) Free-wheeling discussion is not as important in commerce as
it is in politics because such discussion is unlikely to have any
beneficial effect on the product or the service which is the object of
the advertisement. 53
The first justification is logical enough, but there is no reason why
the same logic could not apply in the case of libel. Defamation does
not cause physical injury, 4 but the damage to reputation may cause
pecuniary loss that might equal or exceed the pecuniary loss caused
by reliance on a misleading advertisement.
The second justification is reasonable in a number of instances.
There are scientific tests which can determine the gas mileage of an
injured party may also have a common law action for fraud. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Cox,
430 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1970), appeal after remand, Harris v. Hertz Corp., 472 F.2d 552 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973).
13 See generally Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLuM. L. REv. 1018 (1956). One
cannot argue with requirements that a poison be labelled as such or that careful instructions
be given for the use of a powerful piece of machinery such as a chain saw. The development
of contract and tort law has also made available remedies based upon representations con-
cerning the quality of a product during the course of its sale. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Calabresi, Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887
(1967); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rev.
791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
A defamatory statement in and of itself may not cause any physical injury, but if the
defamation is so derogatory as to constitute "fighting words," there may indeed be resulting
physical injury to one party or the other.
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automobile or the vitamin content of an ounce of cereal. Neverthe-
less, in advertising as in every other field of human endeavor, there
is a great deal of room for opinion and conjecture. No court has
seriously considered the difficulty of determining the objective facts
with respect to advertising. In some instances, the truth or falsity
of an advertising claim may not only be difficult to prove but the
results may vary depending upon the user. This is not to suggest
that the state should not regulate the promotion and sale of those
products which pose potential dangers not readily discoverable by
the consumer (for example, drugs or household cleansers). The state
has a clear interest in so doing. However, the ease of ascertaining
the truth of an advertising claim is a weak justification for the
regulation of the content of speech under the First Amendment and
one which may involve the judicial process in time-consuming in-
quiries of minimal social or legal utility 5 The first justification
discussed above is the more compelling one for the regulation of the
promotion of potentially dangerous products.
The third justification for prior restraints on advertising is a de-
parture from the notion that the promotion of free and open debate
unhampered by government interference will eventually lead to
improvements in the organization and functioning of society. Pro-
fessor Emerson states the traditional postulate well:
Hence an individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear
all sides of the question, especially as presented by those who
feel strongly and argue militantly for a different view. He must
consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to
opposition, make full use of different minds to sift the true
from the false. Conversely, suppression of information, discus-
sion, or the clash of opinion prevents one from reaching the
most rational judgment, blocks the generation of new ideas,
Some of the FTC cases in the advertising area demonstrate the types of problems
presented to the courts. In Mueller v. United States, 262 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1958), the issue
under consideration was an advertising claim for a cure for baldness. The courts were called
upon to weigh the validity of an FTC regulation of advertising for hemorrhoidal remedies in
Grove Laboratories v. FTC, 418 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1969), and in FTC v. National Comm'n
on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2623 (1976), the court
determined that advertisements questioning the relationship of egg consumption to heart
disease were representations concerning the quality of a product and promoting its use and,
therefore, were within the scope of regulation by the FTC. In Charles of the Ritz Distribs.
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944), the court stated that the FTC was charged with
the duty to protect the general public, including the ignorant, the unthinking, and the
credulous, from advertising claims. That case involved an ad for skin creams.
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and tends to perpetuate error. This is the method of the
Socratic dialogue employed on a universal scale. 6
It has been argued that the clash of opinion in advertising,
whether truthful or not, does not lead to any product or service
improvement in the same sense that the clash of opinion in politics
may lead to better government or to some other social good. ' This
argument lacks rational foundation. Advertising is a means of solic-
iting sales; competitive success directly depends upon an ability to
do so. Profitability, or the lack thereof, bears a direct relationship
to product development and improvement. Although new products
may not always be better products, the same can be said for new
political ideas. Free expression is desirable not because it will result
in some improvement in every instance, but because in the long run
it will lead to the fullest development of man's capabilities. The free
flow of information about products and services, by making rational
economic choices possible, should eventually lead to the develop-
ment of improved products and services.
This third justification is a reflection of the unspoken assumption
that commerce somehow dirties the purity of speech which, to be
protected, must be related to lofty ideals." The truth standard for
regulation is not, in and of itself, objectionable in terms of the First
Amendment. The manner of its implementation may be. What
needs to be recognized is that the truth standard is applied to com-
mercial speech in a distinctly different and more stringent manner
than it is applied to political or social commentary. Prior restraints
and censorship are allowed and content is closely analyzed. The
Prescription Drugs case may make it clear that speech in a commer-
1 EMERSON, supra note 10, at 7.
7 See, e.g., Deceptive Advertising, supra note 19, at 1029. One commentator has sug-
gested a different approach to the consideration of First Amendment questions in a commer-
cial context with the focus on the rights of the advertising creator himself. An advertisement,
by this analysis, represents the artistic creation of one or more individuals and, as such, is
deserving of recognition as protected speech. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Mar-
ketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429
(1971).
The following statement puts the matter in the proper perspective:
Yet the proper functioning of the economy and the stimulation of consumption are
issues of public concern and although it can be said that the right to deceive an
individual seeking satisfaction of his personal wants and to profit by the deception
is not necessary to liberty and self-government, such abuse of otherwise desirable
activity has clear parallels in political hucksterism and religious charlatanism.
Deceptive Advertising, supra note 19, at 1029-30.
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cial context is not bereft of First Amendment protection, but that
case does not remove the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy
that will continue to exist as long as prior regulation of the content
of commercial speech receives judicial and legislative sanction.
The relationship of spoken or printed words to the commission of
an unlawful act bears directly upon the second prong of the
Prescription Drugs test, that of legitimacy. It has been stated that
the government may regulate or prohibit the advertising of a prod-
uct or service which it has determined to be unlawful. 59 It has even
been suggested that the state may legitimately regulate or limit
even truthful advertising of a lawful product or service if the state
has the inherent authority to limit or to regulate the sale of the
product or service.6" Cigarettes are a good example: their manufac-
ture and sale are lawful, but the federal government has completely
banned their advertisement on electronic media subject to regula-
tion by the Federal Communications Commission.61 The question
51 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
388 (1973), where the Court said, "We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could
be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes." For
a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 84-93 infra. See also Camp of the Pines,
Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1945); Note, Freedom of
Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1195 (1965).
0 See Lydick, State Control of Liquor Advertising Under the United States Constitution,
12 BAYLOR L. REV. 43 (1960). As stated in Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 13 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (S.D. Cal. 1935):
Advertising is one of the incidents in the sale of liquors. If the state, under its police
power, can prohibit the whole business from being carried on, it can prohibit and
control any of its incidents. The prohibition against certain forms of advertising is
really a prohibition against soliciting of business. Advertising is soliciting in the last
analysis.
That court's analysis was premised on the assumption that advertising is incidental to the
act of selling liquor. If the state has banned the sale or importation of liquor, it may indeed
have considerable power to regulate liquor advertising. But would a state have the authority
to prohibit an ad which stated that liquor was legally available for sale in an adjoining state?
Such a prohibition might violate the Bigelow standards if it were determined that there was
significant public interest in the sale and purchase of liquor. To go further and suggest that
the state may not only regulate but may also prohibit the advertising of lawful products and
services is to run afoul of the Prescription Drugs case.
11 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). The banning
of cigarette ads on the electronic media spawned the lively case of Capital Broadcasting Co.
v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), afl'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). The three-judge court
upheld by a 2-1 vote the validity of that Act. The majority neatly skirted the broadcasters'
argument that the loss of revenues would infringe their First Amendment rights:
Even assuming that loss of revenue from cigarette advertisements affects petition-
ers with sufficient First Amendment interest, petitioners, themselves, have lost no
right to speak-they have only lost an ability to collect revenue from others for
broadcasting their commercial messages.
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here is not the regulation of speech which is itself part of an illegal
act, such as communications between criminal co-conspirators, but
the regulation of speech discussing or offering for sale a lawful prod-
uct or a service which is or could be subject to government control.
If the Prescription Drugs case holds that commercial speech is
entitled to First Amendment protection subject only to regulation
for truthfulness and legitimacy, then there is a serious question
whether the government may regulate or prohibit truthful commer-
cial speech about a lawful product or service. The electronic media
do not provide a good example because of pervasive federal regula-
tion in that area,12 but if the government sought to limit or to pro-
hibit advertisement of cigarettes but not to limit or ban their sale,
such a ban would be inconsistent with the rationale of the
Prescription Drugs case. If the products or services are lawful and
if the speech describing or discussing them is truthful and not ob-
scene, then there is no rational basis consistent with a system of free
expression for further regulating or limiting that speech.
Nonetheless, a major federal statute, the Fair Housing Act, 3 spe-
cifically prohibits the advertising of truthful information about law-
ful activity. In addition, that Act and at least one Supreme Court
case 64 sanction the application of penalties and remedies against the
publisher as well as against the originator. In other words, both a
333 F. Supp. at 584.
Judge Skelly Wright's dissent raised some interesting questions. Significantly, the ban
resulted in a substantial increase in the profitability of the cigarette business. The FCC had
previously invoked its fairness doctrine to require the broadcasting of antismoking ads in
response to commercial cigarette messages. The result, according to Judge Wright, was to
increase the advertising costs of the cigarette industry and to reduce smoking. The industry
itself supported the statutory ban on ads and thereby rid itself of the pesky antismoking
advertisements. The effect of the ban was to cut off an open debate and to stifle the free flow
of information, a result clearly counter to the purpose of the First Amendment. Id. at 587-
91. Judge Wright further noted:
The only interest which might conceivably justify such a total ban is the state's
interest in preventing people from being convinced by what they hear-the very sort
of paternalistic interest which the First Amendment precludes the state from as-
serting.
Id. at 594.
62 The FCC's "fairness doctrine," for instance, requires television and radio stations to
give equal time to proponents of opposing views on matters of social and political significance.
See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Friends of the Earth v.
FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (Supp. V 1975).
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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newspaper and an advertiser can be liable for printing an advertise-
ment containing language or information which the government
seeks to regulate. This potential liability raises profound First
Amendment questions and should be analyzed in the context of
Prescription Drugs.
IV. HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE LEGITIMACY
TEST AS APPLIED TO NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENTS
Section 808(b)(1) of the Fair Housing Act 65 makes it illegal
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with re-
spect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin....
The prohibition is directed not only at sellers, landlords, and real
estate agents, but also at newspapers, magazines, printers, radio
announcers, TV stations, and other disseminators of information,
all traditionally protected by the First Amendment. There are cer-
tain exceptions to the antidiscrimination provisions of the statute.
An individual homeowner may lawfully discriminate in the sale or
rental of his home. Likewise, an owner of a small boarding house
may discriminate if he lives there. Additionally, certain religious
and private organizations are excepted." The advertising ban, how-
ever, is catholic in its coverage and prohibits the advertising of
1 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (Supp. V 1975).
as 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) exempts single family homes which are offered for sale or rent
by the owner with certain limitations. Section 3603(b)(2) contains what is popularly called
the exception for "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house" and exempts:
rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to
be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if
the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his resi-
dence.
Section 3607 contains an exception which allows religious organizations and private clubs
to limit sales or rentals to members of that religion or to club members, again with certain
limitations not pertinent here.
An act of discrimination by a seller or a lessor which is permissible under the Fair
Housing Act may, however, violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) which provides that
[a]ll citizens of the. United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968); Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974).
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lawful as well as unlawful preferences.67 A violation of the statute
may subject a publisher to a private action for damages including
punitive damages up to $1,000 plus attorney's fees"8 and to a govern-
ment action for prospective injunctive relief.69
The problems that can thereby be created for a newspaper were
dramatically illustrated in the case of Holmgren v. Little Village
Community Reporter,70 an action against three small neighborhood
newspapers in Chicago. The complaint sought a permanent injunc-
tion against the publication of classified advertisements which indi-
cated a preference for persons of a particular national origin.7' The
court dismissed a challenge to the Fair Housing Act and granted the
injunction without respect to the legality of the underlying discrimi-
nation. Interestingly, the court said that if the desired restrictions
were lawful under the Act, the parties could talk about their prefer-
ences to potential purchasers, but they could not buy space in a
newspaper and publish a printed statement indicating the lawful
preferences. 72 It is difficult to understand how such a distinction can
be justified in the face of the First Amendment.
" The language does not specifically mention the exceptions contained in 42 U.S.C. §
3607, but the exceptions of 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) are specifically included within the advertis-
ing ban. See note 66 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) provides a private remedy for "actual damages and not more than
$1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case
of a prevailing plaintiff: Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not
financially able to assume said attorney's fees." An indigent complainant is entitled to a court
appointed attorney to pursue his private action. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b).
", 42 U.S.C. § 3613 gives the Attorney General authority to initiate an action for preven-
tive relief when any group of persons has been denied any rights granted by the Act "and
such denial raises an issue of general public importance . . . "
42 U.S.C. § 3617 further provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person
in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or
on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of
this title. This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.
70 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. I1. 1971).
The advertisements were defended, in part, as a legitimate attempt to insure that
tenants would be able to speak a certain language. The court thought that an indication of a
language preference would itself constitute a preference for a certain national origin. Although
there is some logic to the court's conclusion, it is not necessarily compelling. That one can
speak French does not necessarily mean that one is of French origin. The case did, however,
come out of working class ethnic neighborhoods where the ability to speak a tongue other than
English was probably directly related to national origin.
72 The pertinent portion of the decision follows:
However, it should be noted that this decision only prohibits defendants from
printing the type of advertisements which plaintiff has appended to his motion for
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The Holmgren decision must have led to one or more of the follow-
ing results:
(1) Landlords and sellers covered by the Act were prohibited
from advertising unlawful preferences in the local newspapers.
(2) The newspaper defendants lost certain advertisements and
the revenue from them.
(3) Landlords and owners who were within exceptions to the Act
refrained from advertising or stopped indicating their lawful prefer-
ences and placed general advertisements.
The first result is the one clearly within the intended scope of the
Fair Housing Act. Insofar as it is directed toward the originator,
there is little constitutional difficulty.73 But insofar as the prohibi-
tion is directed toward the newspapers, Holmgren and the statute
compel newspapers to act as enforcement agents for the govern-
ment. It is within the discretion of newspapers to accept, censor, or
reject ads based upon their own business and editorial judgment,7 4
but Holmgren and the statute subject that discretion to the scrutiny
of the Justice Department. This necessarily makes the presence of
the federal government felt in editorial offices and forces upon news-
papers work which should be done by the Justice Department. This
summary judgment. That is, defendants cannot publish ads which indicate a pref-
erence for buyers or tenants of particular national origins. This decision does not,
however, preclude the same sellers and landlords who are no longer permitted to
express national origin preferences in newspaper ads from exercising such a
preference in personal negotiations with prospective buyers and tenants, provided,
of course, that the sellers and landlords come within the terms of 42 U.S.C.
§ 3603(b).
342 F. Supp. at 513-14 (emphasis supplied).
13 This statement must, of course, be subject to the caveat of Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 27-35 supra. If the speech is not a
solicitation to do an unlawful act in the jurisdiction where it is unlawful, but just provides
information concerning a place where such an act is lawful, then it is questionable that such
speech may be prohibited. It should also be noted that the Virginia statute at issue in Bigelow
was aimed not only at the prevention of abortions but also at any attempts to encourage
abortions. Thus, the speech need not have been connected with any illegal act of abortion if
the purpose of the speech was to encourage Virginia women to have abortions, whether legal
or not.
' See Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971);
Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Carpets By the Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F.
Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis. 1973). For a contrary view, see Barron, Access to the Press-A New
First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
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is a significant intrusion of the government into an area of tradi-
tional First Amendment protection.
The second and third results would infringe upon another basic
purpose of the First Amendment-the assurance of the free flow of
information. Revenues lost by the prohibition of a certain category
of advertisements may not be too great in any one instance, but the
precedent and the cumulative effect might have adverse conse-
quences. As two commentators have said:
Any restriction which materially diminishes advertising reve-
nues could have a chilling effect on the functional viability of
the press and thus run afoul of the First Amendment.7 5
The third result would not necessarily affect a newspaper's reve-
nues, but it would certainly restrict the free flow of information.
Suppose that a German male owns a small boarding house which
falls within one of the exceptions to the Act. He may lawfully re-
strict his rentals to German-speaking males of Prussian origin, but
he cannot advertise that fact. If he runs a general advertisement,
he will probably receive numerous inquiries from persons other than
German-speaking males of Prussian origin. Everyone's time will be
wasted, and the efficacy of the advertisement will be severely dimin-
ished. Such a limitation on the communication of information about
a lawful activity serves no rational or legitimate purpose in a system
of free expression.76
The problems raised by Holmgren are also present in United
States v. Hunter,7 a government action against the publisher of a
community newspaper in the Maryland suburbs of Washington.
The newspaper had printed a classified advertisement for a rental
which indicated a preference for whites. The advertiser was within
one of the exceptions to the Fair Housing Act and could lawfully
discriminate in favor of whites. The government sought to enjoin
further publication of such ads, and the publisher unsuccessfully
challenged the constitutionality of the Act's prohibition on advertis-
ing.
7 DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
745, 746 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DeVore & Nelson].
", For an extensive treatment of the role of the First Amendment in supporting and
encouraging the free flow of information and the justification for First Amendment protection
for commercial speech on informational grounds, see Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
429 (1971).
77 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
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In upholding the Act's validity, the court went through a four-step
reasoning process. First, the advertisement was "commercial
speech" within the meaning of Chrestensen and was, therefore, sub-
ject to government regulation. 78 This line of reasoning is too facile
in light of the Prescription Drugs case, but Hunter did antedate that
decision. Second, the prohibition applied to all publishers, not just
to newspapers, and thus there was no unconstitutional discrimina-
tion.79 The Hunter court was correct in that the language of the
statute does not restrict its impact to newspapers, but the statute
may be discriminatorily applied as in Holmgren where the court
considered it permissible to talk about discrimination but not to
advertise it." Third, there would be no diminution of advertising
revenues because the publication of discriminatory ads was illegal
everywhere and advertisers would remain with the newspaper and
publish lawful ads. This point is well taken with respect to advertis-
ers who had sought to engage in unlawful discrimination, but it
again fails to take into account the exceptions to the Act. The utility
of a published advertisement can be drastically reduced for the
person who wishes to make a lawful preference,8' and if such a
7R One commentator has suggested that the advertisement in Hunter was a form of social
commentary subject to traditional First Amendment protection.
The court's failure to explain exactly why the commercial speech precedents were
applicable is particularly disturbing here, where the advertisements themselves
constituted, in a very real sense, social expression, relating more to the advertiser's
preference in neighbors, than to preferences in a "business context."
Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The First Amendment at a Discount, 41 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 60, 84 (1974).
11 There have been instances in which statutes were invalidated because of their peculiar
effect on newspapers, such as a tax on gross receipts from advertising. See, e.g., Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
"' Neither Holmgren nor Hunter dealt with yard signs. The validity of a blanket prohibi-
tion on "for sale" and "sold" signs was the central issue in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 9,
1976). The majority determined that the ordinance prohibiting the signs was a valid exercise
of the police power of the township to prohibit "panic selling" of homes and that the informa-
tion communicated by yard signs was commercial speech within the meaning of Chrestensen.
The decision was rendered prior to Prescription Drugs, and it will be interesting to see what
effect that decision will have on the Linmark case in the Supreme Court. Linmark does,
however, involve questions of racial discrimination as well as free speech, and it is conceivable
that the case could be decided on other than First Amendment grounds. Two other courts
have dealt directly with ordinances regulating yard signs. The results were not consistent,
but there were significant differences in the ordinances under scrutiny. See Barrick Realty,
Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974); DeKalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman
& Bd. of Comm'rs of Roads & Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Query whether a
poster written by a homeowner and placed on his house or in his yard would be an "advertise-
ment" or merely the sort of communication suggested as permissible in Holmgren.
"I See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
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person decides to seek alternative means of publicizing the availa-
bility of his property, newspapers will lose that potential revenue.
Fourth, there would be no undue burden placed on a newspaper
because the advertisements are easy to police and the violations are
apparent on the face of the ads. This is the most troublesome justifi-
cation advanced by the court. It assumes that a newspaper may
properly be called upon to perform a governmental policing func-
tion, and it glosses over the practical difficulties in determining
what may be a mixed question of law and fact-whether an ad is in
compliance with or in violation of the Act.
The Fair Housing Act, Holmgren, and Hunter take a shotgun
approach to the enforcement of the advertising ban by prohibiting
all discriminatory advertisements whether the underlying discrimi-
nation is lawful or not. It might be argued that such a wholesale ban
is necessary as a practical matter because of the difficulty in deter-
mining on a case-by-case basis who may discriminate with impunity
and who may not. Such an argument turns the First Amendment
on its head. If there is difficulty in making such a determination,
the proper cure is to amend the statute to clarify the prohibited acts
of discrimination and the exceptions.
Even if the prohibition were limited to advertisements stating
illegal preferences, the practical effect might well be the same. As-
suming that all the ads in question contained blatantly discrimina-
tory language, which is not likely, a newspaper's editors would be
required to uidertake an investigation of each advertiser in order to
determine whether or not he came within an exception to the Act. 2
To protect his newspaper, an editor might understandably decide
to apply a blanket proscription against all colorably discriminatory
advertisements.
An even more difficult situation can be created by the use of
"code words." In a certain context an apparently innocent state-
ment could convey a message that was prohibited. Suppose that a
black-owned real estate firm which has traditionally specialized in
the sale and rental of homes to and from black families places an
12 Can editors be expected to examine every boarding house to determine whether it is
within the "Mrs. Murphy" exception? The exemption in 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) is partially
defined in terms of intent. See note 66 supra. What if Mrs. Murphy's boarding house is now
occupied by more than four families, but Mrs. Murphy does not intend for it to remain so
crowded and hopes to reduce the number to four? How is an editor to determine Mrs.
Murphy's intent?
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advertisement in a newspaper which states that the firm specializes
in a certain part of a city which is predominantly black. Presuma-
bly, a white or an oriental family could answer the ad and buy a
home through the firm. If not, the firm would probably be in viola-
tion of the Fair Housing Act. Nevertheless, to persons familiar with
the city and its neighborhoods, the tag line indicating that the firm
specialized in a certain area of town could be understood to indicate
a "preference . . . based on race. . . ." Similarly, an advertise-
ment by a white-owned firm that contained a statement that the
firm specializes in homes in Whiteville, which is known to be an
expensive, suburban, lily-white community, could be read to indi-
cate a similar preference. Potential customers might be discouraged
by the language of the advertisements even though neither company
engaged in any acts of discrimination. While it may be desirable to
rid society of artificial barriers based on race, sex, and other factors,
the question is whether the government can or should call upon
newspaper editors to act as government censors and to subject every
advertisement to a careful analysis to determine whether it might
possibly indicate a latent discriminatory bias on the part of the
advertiser. In this instance, the remedy seems worse than the ill.
A similar problem might occur in other areas. 3 Code words could
undoubtedly be used to communicate the availability of illegal
drugs or other substances. If the Court, in applying the legitimacy
test of Prescription Drugs, were to allow publishers to be held liable
for ads which are subtle in their promotion of illegal activities, pub-
lishers might be forced to investigate the intent of the advertiser.
Such a task would be formidable indeed.
The assumption in Holmgren, Hunter, and the Fair Housing Act
that the government can call upon newspaper editors to act as polic-
ing agents and subject them to liability if they fail to do so was also
an issue in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations.4 Unfortunately, that issue was not squarely ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court, and the result was a very unsatis-
factory opinion.
Pittsburgh had enacted an ordinance which was designed to pro-
hibit sexual discrimination in employment, a legitimate function of
'" See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
A 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
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government as our society currently views the regulation of eco-
nomic activity. Prior to 1969, the Pittsburgh Press had segregated
its "help wanted" advertisements into male and female columns.
After the passage of the ordinance, the Press changed the format of
its classified advertising pages so that the "help wanted" section
had columns entitled "Jobs-Male Interest" and "Jobs-Female
Interest." Advertisers were allowed to choose whichever column
they preferred. The Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations
considered this method of classification to be a violation of the
antidiscrimination ordinance and issued a cease and desist order to
forbid the practice. The dispute was taken to the Pennsylvania state
courts where the order was narrowed to apply to ads for jobs covered
by the antidiscrimination provisions of the ordinance. 5 That order
was affirmed by a five to four decision of the Supreme Court. 6
The Pittsburgh Press case was decided prior to Prescription
Drugs, and the majority relied on Chrestensen and the commercial
speech doctrine. The Court briefly focused on the scope of the in-
junction and determined that it was sufficiently narrow to with-
stand the newspaper's argument that it was unconstitutionally
broad and vague. 87 However, a crucial factor in the majority's opin-
ion, and perhaps the most important factor for the decision, was the
determination by the Court that the regulation of classified adver-
tisements was incidental to and coextensive with the regulation of
employment discrimination:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by ad-
vertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the
regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity
itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental
to a valid limitation on economic activity.8
" Id. at 380-81.
" This case resulted in a fascinating philosophical split on the Court. Justice Powell
wrote the Court's opinion in which Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and White joined.
The dissenters were equally as mixed: Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Douglas, Stewart,
and Blackmun each wrote separate opinions. One wonders how the case would have been
decided with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Harlan, and Fortas in place of Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Powell.
413 U.S. at 390.
" Id. at 389. One commentator has suggested that the case could have been decided
solely on the basis of the illegality point if the Court had followed through on its analogy to
advertisements for drugs and prostitutes. (See note 59 supra.) That is, the Court could have
reasoned that the speech was part and parcel of the unlawful discrimination without relying
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In contrast to the Fair Housing Act, the Pittsburgh authorities
sought to prohibit only the classification of non-exempt jobs in the
newspaper's columns. Jobs which could legitimately be restricted to
one sex or another 9 could continue to be advertised in sex-
designated columns. However, there was no requirement of a show-
ing of actual discrimination by an advertiser or by the newspaper
prior to the invocation of the advertising ban.
In their dissenting opinions, both the Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart expressed particular concern for what they considered to be
an unwarranted governmental intrusion into the editorial function
of a newspaper. 0 There was no indication in the record of any actual
discrimination. The ban was a prophylactic measure designed to
stifle the flow of certain information which might suggest the possi-
bility of discrimination. It was the connection between the speech
and the act of discrimination, or the lack thereof, which most con-
cerned Justice Douglas.9' He was not convinced that the classifica-
on the commercial speech doctrine. 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1258, 1269 n.62 (1974). This position
has been disputed by commentators who suggest that the illegality test is only a partial basis
for the decision and that the retention of the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy was
of considerable significance. A noncommercial ad which criticized the ordinance would prob-
ably have been subjected to more traditional First Amendment standards. DeVore & Nelson,
supra note 75, at 763.
"2 The ordinance banning the discrimination did not apply, for example, to employers
of fewer than five persons. 413 U.S. at 380.
11 The Chief Justice thought the decision represented an unjustified expansion of the
commercial speech doctrine and warned:
It also launches the courts on what I perceive to be a treacherous path of defining
what layout and organizational decisions of newspapers are "sufficiently asso-
ciated" with the "commercial" parts of the papers as to be constitutionally unpro-
tected and therefore subject to governmental regulation.
Id. at 393 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart was especially concerned with prior restraint and the preservation of
editorial freedom:
The Court today holds that a government agency can force a newspaper pub-
lisher to print his classified advertising pages in a certain way in order to carry out
governmental policy. After this decision, I see no reason why government cannot
force a newspaper publisher to conform in the same way in order to achieve other
goals thought socially desirable. And if government can dictate the layout of a
newspaper's classified advertising pages today, what is there to prevent it from
dictating the layout of the news pages tomorrow?
Id. at 403 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 397. Justice Douglas also characterized the want ad as a form of expression that
was more than the mere offer of a commercial transaction-the ad by its very terms conveyed
a message and a preference. He thought such expression should be protected.
I would let any expression in that broad spectrum flourish, unrestrained by Govern-
ment, unless it was an integral part of action-the only point which in the Jeffer-
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tion scheme adopted by Pittsburgh Press could legitimately be con-
strued to be an integral part of any illegal discrimination.
The Douglas dissent emphasizes the perennial problem posed by
any attempt to regulate speech. Is the speech nothing more than
speech or is it a necessary and integral part of an unlawful act?
Justice Douglas argued that there should be a prior showing of a
causal nexus between the unlawful act and the speech which the
government seeks to regulate before any regulation can be ap-
proved.12 The logic of his argument is compelling. Although there
was no such affirmative showing of a causal nexus in the Pittsburgh
Press case, such a nexus might have been provable. The choice of
classification was left to the advertiser and was not made by the
newspaper, and the selection of a certain sex-designated column by
a potential employer does indicate something about his preference.
Had the classifications been made by the newspaper, its First
Amendment arguments in favor of editorial discretion as opposed
to government intrusion might have been more persuasive. 3
The Pittsburgh Press decision is reconcilable with the
Prescription Drugs case, but the ban on advertising imposed by the
Fair Housing Act and approved by Holmgren and Hunter is not.
The latter prohibit the communication of truthful information
about lawful activity. If Prescription Drugs means what it says, then
such a prohibition cannot stand consistent with the First Amend-
ment and with the "truthful and legitimate" standard there estab-
lished. By comparison, the regulation of speech at issue in
Pittsburgh Press was limited to descriptions of jobs which were
subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the Pittsburgh ordi-
nance. If the speech is in fact connected with actual discrimination
in violation of the ordinance, then the speech can be made subject
to regulation under the "legitimacy" prong of the Prescription
Drugs case. The problem of proving a causal connection discussed
by Justice Douglas is a fact question not necessarily involving First
Amendment theory. The legitimacy test is one which has its roots
in traditional First Amendment analysis and, like the truth stan-
sonian philosophy marks the permissible point of governmental intrusion.
Id. at 399 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 397-99.
I See note 74 supra and note 97 infra and accompanying text.
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dard, does not suggest theoretical problems of any greater difficulty
for commercial speech than for traditionally protected speech.
94
The truth and legitimacy test does continue to create problems
despite the recognition in Prescription Drugs that commercial
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. The most serious
problem is the imposition on newspapers of the role of government
enforcer. By holding the publisher liable for the publication of an
advertisement which does not meet the legitimacy test, the govern-
ment forces the publisher to act as a censor, a role clearly not envis-
aged by the framers of the First Amendment.9" Although liability for
the publication of an untruthful commercial advertisement has not
yet been imposed upon the publisher as opposed to the advertiser,
the precedent established with respect to the legitimacy of the ad-
vertisement could be applied with respect to the truthfulness of the
advertisement. That could place an impossible burden on newspa-
pers."
By enlisting newspapers and other communicators of information
into the ranks of government censors, the state is, in essence, mak-
ing editorial judgments about what may and may not be printed. It
11 In the Pittsburgh Press case the Court made it clear that a newspaper could be forbid-
den to publish a want ad which proposed a sale of narcotics or which solicited business for
prostitutes. 413 U.S. at 388. In such a case the speech itself is part of the illegal act and
prohibiting such speech is not fundamentally different from imposing criminal sanctions for
continuing an illegal conspiracy by means of speech. See note 14 supra. Of course, there may
be substantial factual problems involved if the advertisement is not clearly for an illegal
purpose but is couched in some form of code words. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
" The press was not intended to be the handmaiden of government but its skeptical
critic. In the words of the late Justice Black:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protec-
tion it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve
the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform
the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
" See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
395-96 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In defamation cases, for example, publishers are only
held to a standard of actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth when the subject of the
comment is a public official. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Where
the complaining party is not a "public figure," he must still prove fault on the part of the
publisher. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Chief Justice's concern in
Pittsburgh Press was the possible establishment of a precedent for something akin to a strict
liability standard.
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has been repeatedly held that a newspaper is free to reject or to
censor advertisements as it sees fit, free from any sanction, public
or private. 7 Moreover, the state has consistently been restrained
from requiring a newspaper to publish that which it does not want
to publish. As the Chief Justice stated in Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,5 a case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
Florida right to reply statute:
We see that beginning with Associated Press, . . . the
Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction or
requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by the gov-
ernment on a newspaper to print that which it would not other-
wise print. The clear implication has been that any such a
compulsion to publish that which "'reason' tells them should
not be published" is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an
undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not
mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it
cannot be legislated.9
If the state may not compel newspapers to publish that which
they do not want to publish, then logically the state should not
prohibit a newspaper from publishing whatever its editors want to
publish. Logic, unfortunately, falls prey to situation. The state can-
not compel a newspaper to print an obscenity, but it can prohibit
the newspaper from printing an obscenity or at least provide post-
publication sanctions sufficient to deter its publication. The con-
verse must, therefore, be that the state may not prohibit a newspa-
per from publishing whatever the editors choose to publish so long
as it falls within the protection of the First Amendment. That re-
turns us to the standards of the Prescription Drugs case. The two-
part proposition that may be derived from that case and Miami
Herald is as follows:
(1) The state may not compel the publication of any matter
whatsoever.'
" See cases cited at note 74 supra. As stated by one court:
We can find nothing in the United States Constitution, any federal statute, or
any controlling precedent that allows us to compel a private newspaper to publish
advertisements without editorial control of their content merely because such ad-
vertisements are not legally obscene or unlawful.
Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1971).
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
Id. at 256.
,o This proposition obviously does not apply to the electronic media because the FCC
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(2) The state may not prohibit the publication of any commer-
cial matter so long as it is truthful and relates to lawful products,
services, or activities, subject to the caveat that truth may not be
an absolute defense to an action for invasion of privacy. 10'
The failure of Hunter and Holmgren is that they do not articulate
any prohibition against a state requirement that newspapers act as
censors for the advancement of some state-sanctioned interest, such
as the elimination of racial, sexual, and ethnic discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing. This writer would add a third part to the
above proposition:
(3) The state may not require the press to be responsible for the
censorship of advertisements or other publications concerning prod-
ucts or services which are subject to state regulation.
An additional shortcoming of those cases, considered in light of
Prescription Drugs, is that they do not require an initial determina-
tion that there is a connection between an unlawful act and the
speech sufficient to justify its prior limitation or regulation. This
writer would add yet a fourth part to the stated proposition:
(4) The state must affirmatively prove a causal nexus between
an unlawful act and speech prior to the limitation or regulation of
that speech by means other than common law or statutory post-
injury remedies for breach of warranty, false representations, and
the like.
Taken together, the four parts of the proposition would give the
state sufficient authority to protect the public from unlawful prod-
ucts, services, or activities and would also set clearer standards for
First Amendment protection of commercial speech. There is no
question that the state should establish positive guides for its citi-
zens in such socially sensitive areas as race relations. The state also
has a legitimate interest in seeking to limit sexual discrimination
and to protect its citizens, by appropriate regulatory methods, from
dangerous substances or fraudulent schemes. Nevertheless, the
First Amendment is a constitutional prohibition against state inter-
ference with speech and press, and any regulatory scheme which
attempts to limit or to censor expression in the marketplace should
has a pervasive regulatory power in that area. The "fairness doctrine" itself is contrary to
the proposition. See note 62 supra.
"I See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
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be subjected to serious scrutiny and should carry with it a presump-
tion of constitutional infirmity.
V. CONCLUSION
The Prescription Drugs case has, for the most part, eliminated the
unfortunate notion that speech uttered in connection with a com-
mercial transaction is undeserving of First Amendment protection.
The dichotomy between commercial and noncommercial speech
continues to exist, however, by reason of the different standards
that are applied to determine the scope of permissible regulation of
speech in traditionally protected areas on the one hand and speech
in commercial contexts on the other. The pervasive system of eco-
nomic regulation designed to benefit and protect the consumer from
unscrupulous merchants and the system of censorship and prior
restraints applicable to advertising will continue to distinguish com-
mercial speech and set it apart from other categories of expression.
The method of application of the "truthful and legitimate" stan-
dard of Prescription Drugs could also have a profound effect on the
actual degree of protection afforded to commercial speech by the
courts.
The regulation that intrudes most significantly into areas of First
Amendment protection is that imposed by the Fair Housing Act,
which requires newspapers and other publishers to censor advertise-
ments and similar materials to insure that they refer and relate to
lawful services and activities. The government has improperly
foisted upon newspapers and similar publishers a governmental
function and has made them liable for failure to perform it. This
flies in the face of the purpose and intent of the First Amendment
to protect freedom of expression "against interference by the gov-
ernment in its efforts to achieve other social objectives or to advance
its own interests."'"2 It also establishes an unfortunate precedent for
further regulation in areas other than housing. If the rationale of
Prescription Drugs is applied, however, to cases arising under the
Fair Housing Act, the advertising prohibition should at least be
limited to advertisements which reflect discrimination made unlaw-
ful by that Act.
"' EMERSON, supra note 10, at 29.
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